The recent debate over the pro-cyclical effects of capital regulation has overlooked the important role that bank loan provisions play in the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. Inadequate assessment of expected credit losses leads to under-provisioning and implies that capital has to absorb both expected and unexpected losses, aggravating the negative impact of minimum capital requirements during recessions. In addition, when expected losses are properly reflected in lending rates but not in provisioning practices banks earnings fluctuations magnify true bank profitability oscillations. The agency problems faced by different bank stakeholders (outsiders versus insiders) may help to explain the prevailing and often unsatisfactory institutional arrangement. We test our hypothesis over a sample of 1176 large commercial banks, 372 of which from non-G10 countries, over the period [1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999]. After controlling for different country specific macroeconomic and institutional features, we find robust evidence of a positive association between loan loss provisioning and banks EBTDA for G10 banks. Such evidence is not confirmed for non-G10 banks, that on average provision too little in good times and are forced to increase provisions in bad times. We also find that the protection of "outsiders" claims over banks' income has negative effects on loan loss provisioning. This paper suggests that cyclical shortages of banks' capital may not only be due to the risk based regulation of bank capital but most prominently to the lack of risk based regulation of banks' loan loss provisioning practices. We focus on banks' loan loss provisions and suggest that capital shortages may often be caused by inadequate provisioning. The blame fo r pro-cyclical effects associated with capital shortages should therefore shift to some extent from the content of currently proposed capital regulation to its inadequate comprehensiveness.
Introduction
2 Pro-cyclical effects of risk-based capital have been a relevant element of concern in the ongoing debate about new bank capital requirements. The deterioration of banks' asset quality during cyclical downturns, in fact, generates higher capital requirements exactly when capital may be more expensive or simply unavailable for weaker institutions. When capital shortages are faced by banks accounting for a large share of total lending to the economy the resulting credit contraction may have systemic implications 3 .
This paper suggests that cyclical shortages of banks' capital may not only be due to the risk based regulation of bank capital but most prominently to the lack of risk based regulation of banks' loan loss provisioning practices. We focus on banks' loan loss provisions and suggest that capital shortages may often be caused by inadequate provisioning. The blame fo r pro-cyclical effects associated with capital shortages should therefore shift to some extent from the content of currently proposed capital regulation to its inadequate comprehensiveness.
The generalized recognition that bank capital should provide a buffer to unexpected losses is in fact based on the implicit assumption that expected losses have already been absorbed by properly set loan loss provisions 4 . When, instead, provisions are inadequate, expected losses will impact on banks' capital. Due to this anomaly capital shortages become more likely and their impact on the real economy tends to be magnified 5 . As a result, for economies where sound provisioning norms are not embedded in bank practices -as it is the case for most emerging economies -the lack of a coherent and 2 We would like to thank Franklin Allen, Jerry Caprio, Larry Promisel and Anthony Santomero for useful discussions and Hosook Hwang for outstanding research assistance. This paper's findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 3 Notwithstanding the widespread concerns, expressed also by the Financial Stability Forum, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has come to the conclusion "that the proper tool to avoid the negative macroeconomic effects of risk based capital requirements may not be found in the regulation of solvency ratios" and that instead "the supervisory review and market discipline pillars of the Accord" should induce banks to "build up sufficient capital during growth periods" (BCBS, 2000, p.2) . 4 Although a more detailed description of the notion of loan loss provisions will be provided in section 2, it suffices here to specify that we refer to general loan loss provisions and not to specific loan loss provisions. 5 The mixed evidence about the effects of new capital requirements on the real economy in G10 countries has been surveyed in BCBS (1999) . Evidence of significant its impact in non-G10 countries is provided by Chiuri et al (2001) .
internationally accepted regulation of loan loss provisions reduces the usefulness of minimum capital regulation.
Notwithstanding its relevance, the regulation of banks' loan loss provisions has attracted considerably less attention than that of banks' minimum capital. We claim that the difficulty faced by the regulation of banks' provisioning practices -and therefore its delayed formulation -lies in the presence of agency problems of difficult solution between different classes of banks' stakeholders such as banks' "outsiders" (minority shareholders or the fiscal authority) and banks' "insiders" (bank managers and majority shareholders).
Lacking a well defined and internationally agreed code of conduct, we face a multiplicity of institutional solutions. In several cases the protection of "outsiders" claims to banks' income may be too rigid or too extensive providing a disincentive to adequate loan loss provisioning with negative repercussions on the stability of the banking system.
We test empirically our conjectures over a sample of 1176 banks from 36 countries for the period 1988-1999 and we find that the level of institutional development significantly affects loan loss provisioning practices. More specifically, we find evidence that the positive association between loan loss provisioning and banks' EBTDAs does not hold for banks located in non-G10 countries. This result is due to inadequate provisioning in the upswing phase of the cycle which forces these institutions to increase provisions during periods of financial distress, lending support to our suggestion that a capital regulation without sound provisioning rules may have pro-cyclical effects. We also find that a higher level of assertiveness of banks' "outsiders" -such as the fiscal authority and minority shareholders -is negatively related to the amount of loan loss provisions, confirming our conjecture about the incentives structure and the conflict of interests among different banks' stakeholders in the definition of provisioning rules. Overall, our empirical findings suggest that pro-cyclical effects of bank capital regulation can be reduced and long run stability of the banking system improved by a regulatory solution which strikes a balance between the conflicting objectives of "outsiders" protection and bank provision enhancement.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 draws from the current debate on banks' capital requirements, defines different forms of loan loss provisions and discusses their role. Section 3 illustrates the agency problems raised by the existence of conflicting claims over banks' income on the part of different stakeholders and the implications on loan loss provisioning. Section 4 illustrates how different provisioning strategies, associated with "outsiders" protection, may affect banks' income smoothing over the cycle. Section 5 describes the econometric test, the nature of the data used and the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes and discusses some policy implications also with reference to the new proposal for new bank minimum capital requirement of the BCBS.
Provisions and expected losses
Although regulatory capital is intended to provide an adequate buffer against adverse occurrences to banks' balance sheets it is not the only relevant buffer bankers can resort to. The prevailing conceptual framework, summarized in Figure 1 , recognizes the existence of two categories of shock absorbers: general loan loss reserves and capital.
Regulatory capital should cope with the occurrence of "unexpected losses", that is losses that are large but infrequent and that therefore can be located far in the tail of the frequency distribution of loan losses. Loan loss reserves should, instead, cope with "expected losses", that is losses which occur on average and can be measured by the mean value of the frequency distribution of loan losses. According to this distinction, the occurrence of losses equal to OB in Figure 1 should be buffered for the amount OA by loan loss reserves and for the amount AB by depleting regulatory capital. What Figure 1 makes clear is that the very effectiveness of regulatory capital as a buffer of unexpected shocks rests on the existence of the subsidiary buffer represented by the reserves created through loan loss provisions.
The conceptual distinction between expected and unexpected components of loan losses carries with it several important implications about the distinctive role and functions of bank capital and loan loss reserves in the domain of risk management, of risk measurement and of accounting procedures.
The first immediate consequence is that loan loss provisions cannot be reduced through portfolio diversification. Differently from capital -which is related to measures of dispersion that can be reduced through portfolio diversification -provisions for individual loans are related to the mean value of the loss distribution and are additive over a portfolio of assets. The same loan will require the same amount of provisions whether it is a part of the vastly diversified portfolio of an internationally active bank or of the concentrated portfolio of a small cooperative bank. While this is not a very exciting
property from the standpoint of a risk manager it has some desirable regulatory implications. In fact, it makes it possible to envisage a relatively simple regulatory approach to loan loss provisioning which, unlike capital regulation, needs not differentiate among institutions of different complexity and is not affected by the composition of banks' loan portfolio. 
Credit risk capital General Provisions

Unexpected losses
The second implication, of statistical nature, is that the need for provisions can be estimated with greater precision than the capital requirement especially when the amount of information about loan defaults is limited. The new regulatory approach set out by the BCBS requires, in fact, that capital be measured by credit losses located at given percentile levels -such as the 1 per cent or the 0.1 per cent -of the highly asymmetric distribution of loan losses. Provisions, instead are referred to the mean value of the same distribution. This conceptual approach has relevant measurement implications due to the fact that the precision of statistical estimates of percentile levels of probability distributions -and the associated level of capital -decreases as the distribution becomes more asymmetric and increases only gradually with the number of available observations (Kupiec, 1995) . This implies that estimates of the expected value -and of the level of provisions -enjoy a greater precision and that the relative precision increases the more asymmetric is the loan loss distribution and the smaller is the sample size. The confidence interva ls around estimated values of provision requirements will therefore always be smaller than those for estimated capital requirements, for any given number of observations. The precision of provision estimates is almost four times higher than capital estimates, when capital covers 99 per cent of the possible losses and the distribution is normal. The relative precision increases when the distribution is asymmetric 6 . The regulatory implications of these statistical facts should not be underestimated. In fact, they suggest that loan loss provisions are simpler and more accurate to measure than banks capital, making "risk based" provisions easier to adopt and to enforce than capital requirements in countries where the volume of credit-related information is relatively low, as in most emerging economies.
The third implication, of accounting nature, is that, lacking a symmetric treatment of expected losses on both sides of the profit and loss account, bank income statements may convey biased notions of bank profitability. For instance, allowing interest premia (on the asset side) but not general provisions (on the cost side) to be equal to expected losses generates an upward bias in bank operating income 7 . The bias is reduced but not eliminated only at the level of the EBTDA, when charges related to loan loss provisions are fully taken into account in the cost side. The bias persists because in most countries, 6 In the case of the normal distribution, for which we have simple analytical expressions of the standard deviation of the relevant sample estimates, the standard deviation of the sample mean is equal to σn
while that of the percentiles is equal to kσn -1/2 , where n defines the sample size and k is approximately equal to 2.13 for the 5% percentile and to 3.77 for the 1% percentile (Kupiec, 1995) . The parameter k (the ratio of the standard deviation of an estimated sample percentile over that of an estimated sample mean) can therefore be interpreted as an indicator of the relative precision displayed by estimated loss provisions over estimated capital requirements. As distributions become more skewed k decreases dramatically. 7 As an example, the European Union Council 86/935 on the annual accounts of banks and other financial institutions which is adopted by all EU member countries does not include provisions, nor specific nor general ones, as a component of operating costs. Since the remuneration for expected losses, represented by notwithstanding considerable differences in accounting procedures, "general" provisions are subject to quantitative restrictions that prevent them from equaling expected losses.
It is important to remind that the bias is not related to "specific" provisions, which are referred to future but certain losses 8 . Specific provisions are somewhat similar to write-offs and are not subject to significant restrictions. "General" provisions, instead, refer to probabilistic losses 9 which, differently from deterministic ones, cannot be supported by loan specific documentation. The lack of such documentation has made the definition of expected losses highly judgmental, controversial and prone to manipulation lending rate premia, cannot be netted from operating income, operating profits tend to give an upward biased measure of profitability. 8 The two categories of provisions follow also different accounting rules. Specific provisions appear as charges in the income statement and generate a "contra assets' reserve or, as in the EU countries, a reduction of assets in the balance sheet. General provisions, instead, are registered separately in the income statements and generate reserves in the liability side of the balance sheet. 9 Uncertain losses are those that are unpredictable on a loan by loan basis but are statistically well defined (expected) at the portfolio level. 10 While the presence of loan loss provision among the components of regulatory capital seems to be somewhat inconsequential with the conceptual framework adopted by the BCBS, its inclusion could be interpreted as an incentive for higher provisioning. In any case the size of the limit is adequate only to the level of expected losses of an investment grade portfolio, over a three years time period and a recovery ratio of 50 per cent (Moodys, 2000) .
An agency approach to general loan loss provisions
The investments. They also suggest that corporate outsiders tend to be penalized through asset diversion, transfer prices and other appropriation mechanisms on the part of corporate insiders, unless outsiders are given the right to share the firm's profits in accordance with some pro rata mechanism such as defined by dividend payment policies.
This approach can shed some light on the reasons that may have prevented banks from adopting more extensively a symmetric accounting treatment of expected losses in both sides of their ledgers. A previous paper by Kim and Santomero (1977) shows in fact that with incomplete but symmetric information, profit maximizing bank managers should follow profit smoothing strategies, setting provisions in line with expected losses. 11 This suggests that asymmetric information and related agency practices are a fundamental aspect to consider to understand actual provisioning practices. We shall adapt the agency approach to banks extending the class of firms' outsiders, traditionally represented by minority shareholders, to include an additional and powerful player: the fiscal authority. The fiscal authority, although by no mean a corporate outsider, is a very particular one, given his authority to protect his claims over banks' income by mean of legal provisions and mandatory allocation rules.
How does protection of corporate outsiders affect bank provisioning policies? We conjecture that minority shareholders' protection will provide, as in La Porta et al.
( 2000), an incentive for managers to envision higher payout ratios. We also suggest that according to the state of public finances the fiscal authority will adopt more or less stringent rules to protect tax revenues. 12 According to outsiders' effectiveness in protecting their claims, bank managers will revise the share of EBTDA available for provisioning. We conjecture, therefore, that higher shareholder protection and higher public debt ratios to GDP could be associated on average with a lower amount of general provisions.
Do we expect to see at work the same efficiency enhancing dynamics that La Porta et al. (2000) claim to be associated with dividend payments in the corporate sector? The dynamics that they envisage is based on the following sequence of events. The presence of agency costs leads corporate outsiders (minority shareholders) to seek legal protection for their claims over the firm income. Lower retained earnings force the firm to raise more often new capital on the market, exposing it to market discipline and increasing eventually its efficiency.
When we move from the corporate to the banking sector the same chain of events cannot be dismissed but additional elements need to be brought into the picture. In the first place, banks' high leverage makes them more vulnerable to asset values volatility, suggesting the need for larger provisions. It is therefore conceivable that lack of the uncertainty is extended to the distribution of default frequencies, if bankers follow the rational approach of adapting their priors on the basis of new historical evidence, through a Bayesian process. 12 Countries where public ownership of the banking sector eliminates the agency conflict between the management and the fiscal authority still face a conflict between sound management (profit maximization) and pursue of extra-managerial objectives (unrelated to profit maximization). In the extreme case of full differentiated patterns of outsiders protection in the corporate and in the banking sector may lead to under provisioning with negative effects on bank stability. Second, excessive fiscal pressures may reduce, instead of increasing, the present value of net fiscal revenues. In fact, should the tax code discourage provisioning and increase bank fragility, the fiscal authority could be faced in the future with an increased cost of the safety net vastly exceeding the present fiscal cost of adequate tax incentives to sound provisioning practices. Third, less developed institutional settings, lacking the richer set of controls that goes under the name of market discipline, may have to resort more extensively to prescriptive measures, like mandatory payments, to protect corporate outsiders. Such a prescriptive approach may unduly restrict risk management flexibility with ultimate negative effects on banks solidity. Finally, the pervasive prudential regulation of the banking sector seems to make less compelling the argument in favor of dividend protection as a form of minority shareholders protection against rapacious managers.
As for the inclusion of the fiscal authority among bank outsiders, we have scattered evidence that fiscal incentives to loan loss provisioning reacts to the state of public finance. In the US, for instance, the fiscal treatment of bank provisions has followed the evolution of the fiscal deficit. After several decades in which bank regulation allowed banks to built tax exempt provisions, based on historical worst case scenarios, the higher fiscal deficits of the 1980s have been mirrored by a progressive scaling down of tax exemptions and by their final cancellation in 1986 (Conway and Siegenthaler, 1987) . The problem is not alleviated by public ownership of the banking sector. In fact, the heightened perception of an implicit guarantee is likely to further discourage sound provisioning policies exposing banks to the same instability caused by excessive outsiders protection.
Summarizing, the agency approach provides a rationale for some relevant features of the regulatory framework for provisioning that we observe in most countries. The same approach would suggest that the scale of benefits associated to the protection of outsiders claims in the corporate sector may not be the same when considering the banking sector. More specifically, it seems that in the case of banks, a balance needs to state ownership, taxation, as the most effective means of appropriation of banks earnings, still conflicts with the maximization of banks' value.
found between the protection of outsiders and the encouragement of loan loss provisioning. The same approach would suggest that the new methods for computing expected losses, made possible by recent advances in the area of credit risk measurement, are bound to reduce the information asymmetries that have plagued the banking sector in the past and, by reducing the severity of agency problems, will favor the introduction of a risk based approach to loan loss regulation. A concurrent positive development is represented by the worldwide process of fiscal consolidation that may favor tax deductions of loan loss provisions which are in line with expected losses.
Income smoothing properties of loan loss provisioning
We have suggested that adequate loan loss provisioning, by enforcing a symmetric treatment of expected losses on both sides of the income statement, would not only remove accounting distortions in the representation of bank profitability, but also would improve bank stability. In fact, when outsiders find their claim protected during periods of posit ive earnings but are not committed to any loss sharing mechanism during economic downturns, banks tend to face a progressive drainage of provisions as the following simulation will help to visualize. To this end we define, first, the main components of lending rates and then use them in a schematic representation of the profit and loss statement.
Profit maximizing banks set their lending rates (r L ) as a sum of the risk-free interest rate (r B ), of the expected loss ratio E(d) and of the risk premium (k). 13 Expressing the expected losses E(d) as a rate of return per unit of time we have the following expression:
The sum of the risk-free rate (r B ) and the risk premium (k) provides the remuneration for the cost of borrowed funds and of capital. The E(d) component is instead the yearly amount of provisioning that is needed to match the average amount of losses faced by each loan. This simplified representation of banks' interest setting shows that banks will 13 The risk premium under the CAPM model could be quantified by the relation k = β (r m -r B ), where r m is the rate of return of the market portfolio.
experience excess returns in good times when the default rate is lower than E(d) and will not be able to cover their costs when the default rate is higher than its average level.
The spread between the lending rate and the average cost of funding (r D ) times the amount of outstanding loans (L) gives the net interest income (NII). Subtracting the operating costs (OC) and the value of loan losses (∆BL) we get the bank earning before taxes (π). When loan loss provision are kept equal to zero the pre-tax profit takes the form described in equation 2, where loans and bad loans carry a superscript indicating that, differently from other variables, they are stochastic variables with a cyclical pattern:
Equation 2 shows that during cyclical downswings an increase of bad loans and a reduction of the interest income (due to the reduction of outstanding loans) will cumulate their negative effects on pre-tax profits. During economic booms a higher level of loans will, on the contrary, generate higher interest revenues while write offs below average will provide an additional boost to profits.
Let's now turn to the case of partial provisioning where loan loss provisions are set equal to a fraction γ of the expected default ratio E(d):
In this case banks will be willing to set aside provisions in excess of write offs during 
In this case, having set the level of provisions equal to the expected default ratio, there is never a drawing from loan loss reserves larger than the outstanding stock so that the case of previous equation 3B never obtains. As in the case of equation 3A the cyclical impact of write offs on profits has been completely eliminated. In addition, we notice that now also the effect of the asymmetric treatment of expected losses on the revenue and on the cost side of the income statement, represented by the term [(1-γ)E(d)L], has been washed out. With full provisioning the only source of banks' earnings variability is the unavoidable oscillation of the demand for loanable funds over the economic cycle.
To visualize the impact of the three provisioning regimes on bank profitability we have simulated the pattern followed by bank earnings over the cycle. For this purpose we have considered an hypothetical loan portfolio where loans are implicitly rolled over on a yearly basis unless the borrower defaults or the loan is reimbursed. We also have assumed that the amount of write offs increases when the demand for loans is weaker and that as a result of these two forces the NPL ratio oscillates between 4 and 18 per cent of total assets over the cycle. (Fig. 2) . While default ratios of this entity are not infrequent in developing countries our results would not change for countries where, due to a lower cyclical instability and to a better risk management, NPL ratios are less volatile.
14 Figure   3 shows the oscillations of net provisions (fixed provisioning rate less effective write offs) as defined in equations 3 and 4 together with the fluctuations of the operating income. 15 Full provisions show a regular pattern that follows that of the operating income. On the contrary a partial provisioning rule generates a highly irregular pattern of net provisions.
As a result of the interaction of write-offs and net provisioning, in the three provisioning regimes, described by equations 2, 3 and 4, before tax earnings display the oscillations described in Figure 4 .
14 For expository purposes the simulation is conducted around a stationary time trend but results would not be affected considering oscillations of bank lending around a growing time trend. 15 A full description of the cost and income ratios used in the simulations is described in the footnote to With a tax ratio of 20 per cent, income taxes would follow the pattern reported in Figure 5 . We have also considered a payout ratio of 0.5 in order to define the evolution of retained earnings. With full provisioning the above described dynamics leads to a rather stable evolution of retained earnings (and dividends) and to no reduction of existing capital over the cycle (Figure 6 ), while an alternating sequence of retained earnings (and positive dividends) in good times and of capital reductions in bad times appears to prevail in the other two regimes. The simulation shows that whenever banks follow a sound pricing policy but do not fully provision for expected losses an impact on capital is to be expected. The question is whether capital reductions are going to be replenished by retained earnings during cyclical upturns. Table 1 shows that when bank outsiders share the earnings but not the losses a progressive erosion of bank capital takes place: the sum of retained earnings is in fact smaller than the reduction of capital both with no provisions and with partial provisions. Table 1 reports few additional results. The large oscillations of earnings generated by inadequate provisioning do not allow bank outsiders to clearly perceive whether their share in the banks income is different from zero. In fact only in the case of full provisioning the tax authority (taxes) and the shareholders (net profits) achieve positive results that exceed two times the standard deviation and can be considered statistically different from zero with a reasonably high level of confidence. In addition, the higher volatility of profits observed in the case of null and partial provisioning is likely to generate a higher cost of capital which would make capital shortages even more severe in these two regimes.
Let's now briefly consider the implication of setting minimum capital requirements equal to the sum of expected and unexpected losses as suggested by the new capital regulation proposed by the BCBS. The main implication is that the amount of financial resources required to dampen cyclical fluctuations would increase. In fact the level of capital requirement would now include the level of expected losses but would not 
The estimation procedure
In order to verify the nature of the relationship between banks' earnings and to test our hypotheses about the determinants of banks' provisioning decisions, we have estimated the following econometric relationship: 16 To include reserves as a component of minimum capital requirement amounts to set for them a point requirement instead of an average requirement. The destabilizing effects of point requirements have been well understood in the regulation of compulsory reserves on bank deposits that in most countries are required to hold "on average over the maintenance period" but not for every single day, stabilizing bank liquidity fluctuations over the maintenance periods.
Both pooled OLS and fixed effect panel regressions have been estimated first on the whole sample and then separately for the two sub-samples represented by banks located in G10 countries and by those located in non-G10 countries. As an additional check of robustness, the set of estimates for the three samples (total banks, G10 banks, non-G10 banks) has been replicated for shorter sample periods, smaller set of countries, and using more stringent filtering procedures for outliers exclusion. All regressions have been estimated making use of the White correction for heteroskedasticity.
The data
The data include banks' balance sheet information and proxies for country specific macroeconomic and institutional features over the period 1988 to 1999. We included in our sample the countries that had over the sample period at least three commercial banks recorded in the Bankscope database and that are also reported in the La Porta et al. (1998) dataset on legal features. We have then eliminated the banks that over the sample period had less than three consecutive years of balance sheet observations, in order to control for the consistency and quality of bank reporting.
Finally, in order to minimize the effects of measurement errors we have excluded all the outliers by eliminating the bank/year observations that did not meet one of the following conditions:
-a ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets smaller than or equal to 10%; -a ratio of earnings before provisions over total assets smaller than 10%; -a ratio of total loans over total assets bigger than 10 % and smaller than 90%; -a growth rate of bank loans in real terms smaller than 50% in absolute value .
The resulting sample included 36 countries 17 , with a total of 1176 banks, 372 of which from non-G10 countries. The dependent variable is represented by the ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets. Explanatory variables include firm specific determinants and country specific determinants. At the firm level we have considered as a proxy of bank's EBTDA the value of pre-tax earnings net of loan loss provisions, and as proxies of ranging from a minimum of 500 to a maximum of 45.000 US dollars, and an average ratio of public debt to GDP of 45 per cent, ranging from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 135 per cent. A description of the sources and of the construction of each individual variable is provided in the Append ix.
Estimation Results
The estimation results, reported in Tables 3 to 7 , show a considerable degree of stability across the different estimation approaches both in terms of size and sign of the Cross section estimates (Table 3) show a positive relationship between the ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets and bank earnings, confirming previous results for the US market supportive of an income smoothing pattern (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988) . A similarly strong positive relation is displayed by the share of loans over total assets, while a negative relation prevails with respect to the loan growth rate.
Provisions, therefore, seem to exhibit the desirable positive association with earnings but their association with the amount of risk embedded in banks balance sheets is somewhat contradictory. The ratio of loans over total assets has the expected positive sign, while the loan growth rate has a negative sign implying that provisions tend to decrease as a share of total assets when the increase of new lending and the decrease of monitoring tend to reinforce the risk exposure of banks portfolios. Although some mild correlation is present among these variables, their statistical significance and estimated values have shown not to be sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of each of them.
The indicator of the fiscal pressure, represented by the public debt over GDP is also strongly significant with the expected negative sign, supporting the hypothesis that a stronger incentive to widen the tax base may negatively affect banks provisioning patterns. The per capita GDP, instead, does not turn out to be statistically significant but enters with expected sign. In all the previous specifications country dummies turn out to be strongly jointly significant. Among the indicators of the legal system we find evidence Estimation results for G10 banks are reported in Table 5 . They show, again, a large convergence with those from the two previous sets of regressions. The point value of the coefficient related to bank earnings is now higher -0.21 from 0.13 -suggesting that income smoothing behavior may be more pronounced in more developed financial systems. Also the indicators of legal and institutional features appears to be highly significant and each with the expected sign.
The picture changes considerably when we turn to non-G10 countries, as showed in Table 6 . Most notably the relationship between bank earnings and loan loss provisioning seems to disappear. The coefficient turns negative and looses any statistical significance. The fact that the coefficients associated with the proxies of risk exposure are still significant with the same signs of previous equations seems to suggest that the average amount of provisions is not dissimilar between the two groups of countries but that there is a difference in their timing along the cycle, such that an income smoothing pattern prevails only in G10 countries. It is also interesting to observe that the public debt to GDP ratio maintains its negative effect, not dissimilarly from G10 banks, and that also the indicators of a common law legal system maintains its relevance. The same regressions has been run also for non-G10 OECD countries to verify whether the results could have been driven by countries in the lowest income category but results of table 6
were widely confirmed.
As a final test of robustness we have removed the constraint of a common intercept for all banks from the same country, implicit in the OLS pooled regressions and In addition to the cyclicality implications of fixed effect panel estimates, we should recall that the negative impact of the fiscal pressure indicator is also strongly supported and is robust to the inclusion (as reported in Table 7 ) and to the exclusion of per capita GDP.
Overall, the collected empirical evidence support quite robustly our initial guesses. The prevailing incentive structure significantly affects the pattern of banks loan loss provisioning with potential impacts on banks financial fragility. Over our estimation sample, though, the incentive structure has forced a general build up of provisions during cyclical downturns only for banks located in non-G10 countries.
Conclusions
This paper has adopted an agency approach to bank loan loss provisioning similar to that recently used to explain dividend payments in La Porta et al. (2000) . The agency approach claims that the amount of legal protection granted to firm's outsiders affects the allocation of a firm's earnings. In our case we restrict the attention to banking firms and extend the class of firm outsiders, traditionally represented by minority shareholders, to include an additional and powerful player: the fiscal authority.
While it is well known that the fiscal authority may affect relevant business decisions for non financial firms, this is even more so for banks. Excessive restrictions or fiscal disincentives to adequate provisioning may result in the weakening of banks' financial stability. Banks are in fact considerably more leveraged than manufacturing firms, and need to devote a larger share of their operating profits to cover expected future asset depreciations. Banks, though, are also more opaque generating relevant agency costs and the request for higher protection of "outsiders" claims over banks' earnings.
Stronger minority shareholders will be able to reap higher dividend payments and a more assertive fiscal authority will obtain higher tax payments. In the case of the banking system, the fiscal authority, though, needs to properly balance the benefits of higher present fiscal revenues and the costs of larger future liabilities generated by weaker banking systems.
The econometric evidence shows that the protection of outsiders' claims (minority shareholders in common law countries and fiscal authority in high public debt countries) has negative effects on the level of bank provisions. While these effects do not seem to have had a negative impact on the provisioning pattern over the sample period for banks located in G10 countries, this is not so for banks located in non-G10 countries. The latter, in fact, have on average experienced higher flows of loan loss provisions during periods of negative profitability signaling an inadequate amount of provisioning during cyclical upturns.
Lacking adequate incentives for sound provisioning banks may not be able to shelter profits and capital from negative -but expected -repercussions of cyclical downturns. Where cyclical oscillations are particularly wide, as it is the case in less The simulations are done along an hypothetical cycle, assuming an NPL ratio equal to 11 percent; a full provisioning ratio of 11 percent; a partial provisioning ratio of 7.7 percent; a tax ratio of 20 percent; a payout ratio of 50 percent. 
